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 Introduction
In this paper, I criticize the general consumption tax in that it
brings not only an inefficiency of the market equilibrium allocation but
also a corruption of the government by making a possibility of plun-
der a common knowledge among members of the government. A key
observation is that the rate of a general consumption tax is equal to
the gains to trade at the inefficient equilibrium allocation. The gains to
trade corresponds to the maximal rate of default allowed in an infini-
tesimal Pareto improving trade by consumers, and is equal to the
maximum in geometric means of the rates of marginal substitution for
Pareto improving trading cycles at equilibrium. It is by itself unob-
servable for each economic agent, but the implementation of a general
consumption tax makes it observable in the market. Since the govern-
ment is the sole economic agent that has a vast ability to execute
complex trades with default outside the market, it can seize a part of
deliveries in any commodities if that leaves consumers still improved.
Hence the existence of an infinitesimal Pareto improving trade in
which the government can seize in deliveries of all commodities by
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the rate very close to the tax rate becomes a common knowledge
among the members of the government. By finding an infinitesimal
Pareto improving trade in which the government can seize almost
maximally, and extending it with keeping the drop in the rate of sei-
zure minimum so as to force consumers only marginally improved, the
members of the government can gain in utility significantly by a dis-
tribution of the seizure. A candidate of such a trade can be con-
structed by observables in the market, and can be executed under a
long-term balanced budget by the government. A numerical example
on a simple market economy is presented to support the critique.
Recently, an increase of the general consumption tax rate becomes
the biggest concern of all economic agents in Japan. There are many
debates on this theme, both inside and outside the academic field. Out-
side the academic field, people close to the government insists on the
necessity of the tax increase in order to backnecessarywelfare
payments in an aging society, while many consumers fear that it will
further slow thegrowthof the already sluggish economy and de-
prive of their jobs andor incomes. Inside the academic field, those
who praise the notion of a welfare state insists on the necessity of the
tax increase on the ground that the loss of efficiency in the market
system is well compensated by the utilities from a consumption of
public services in the infinite-horizon public economy, while those
close to new-classicals argues that such an intervention in the market
by the government perpetuates the inefficiency of a resource alloca-
tion that dominates the benefit from the governmental services in the
long-run.
The critique I present here is based on a new-classical point of
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view. Though current new-classical arguments tend to concern the
economic growth, the critique focuses on a more fundamental role of
the market system, namely, the maximal realization of the gains from
trade in economic welfare. The reason for this is that, though we can
make up a new-classical model in which the expenditure by the gov-
ernment brings a higher economic growth than that by the private
sector, it is impossible, in principle, to make up a new-classical model
in which it is not ideal to maximize the gains from trade in the mar-
ket. The critique offers an observation that the implementation of a
general consumption tax brings a situation in which the gains to trade
at the equilibrium allocation is positive, so that the gains from trade is
not maximized in the equilibrium.
If the critique ends here, it is not really novel. The notion of the
gains to trade and its property as the maximum in geometric means
of the rates of marginal substitution are fully described in Dubey and
Geanakoplos, and the rate of a general consumption tax being
equal to the gains to trade at the inefficient equilibrium allocation is
straightforward from this property. The novelty of the critique is to
point out the following two simple observations. One is that the gains
to trade at the inefficient equilibrium allocation becomes observable
by each economic agent as the tax rate, especially for members of the
government. The other is that a default is allowed in a trade only if
each transaction in the trade is relatively very small compared with
all other transactions and its relation to the other transactions is not
easily perceived by economic agents involved in it, so that such a
trade is inevitably complex and can be executed only by the govern-
ment. Combining these observations, the critique emphasizes a signal-
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ing effect of the general consumption tax that makes the existence of
an infinitesimal Pareto improving trade by consumers a common
knowledge among members of the government, in which the govern-
ment can seize in deliveries of each commodity by the rate very close
to the tax rate.
The critique survives if one considers various services by the gov-
ernment have external effects on the economic agents in the market,
as models of new-classical public economics assume. In such models, a
Pareto optimal allocation is realized in a Lindahl equilibrium that gives
an efficient cost sharing for the consumption by the government,
which is implemented in a non-market social game in which truth-tell-
ing forms the unique solution, such as a Nash equilibrium. A Lindahl
system extends the market system for private goods to incorporate
the consumption by the government as public goods, so that the same
critique applies in trades of private goods. Obviously, there is no role
for a general consumption tax in the non-market implementing sys-
tem.
In new-classical models, taxes are assumed to be lump-sum in order
to avoid any inefficiency of the equilibrium allocation arising from
them. A typical example is the Diamond OLG model, in which the eco-
nomic growth, the social security, and the effect of a population
growth can be analyzed. Though the lump-sum tax is thought to be
the easiest to collect, in reality, a precise knowledge on incomes of
consumers in the the post-tax equilibrium, along with a precise knowl-
edge of the post-tax equilibrium prices relevant to value them, is re-
quired for the government exante. Hence the government needs a so-
cial infrastructure by which it can grasp the income of each consumer
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precisely. A tax-payer number system or a social security number
system is implemented in many developed countries in order to facili-
tate for the government to grasp the incomes. It is widely recognized
to be primarily important to implement such a system at first. How-
ever, in Japan, no serious effort has been made to implement a tax-
payer number system. No serious attempt is made to restructure the
governmental expenditure fundamentally according to changes in the
economic environment, either. As a result, the debates on a general
consumption tax are dominated by a myopic urgency to maintain the
revenue of the government. They are mostly of technical matters
backed by numerical estimates under rather dubious prospects. They
lack any economic principle to understand its role in an entire social
system. To make things worse, the data in the past shows no visible
sign of the increase in the government revenue by the introduction of,
and the increase in the rate of, a general consumption tax.
This paper can be seen as another attempt by the author to apply a
new-classical general equilibrium welfare analysis to give an insight
into economic problems in the real world. In Kaneko, the wel-
fare effect of temporal credit-saving policies, which promise to give ex-
tra credits to bankrupt investors without clarifying a financial re-
source to back them at the time they are implemented, is analyzed to
show that all investors, including even bond holders, are illusionary
improved at the time the policies are implemented since the equilib-
rium leverage contract is adjusted along its content under the circum-
stance that the equilibrium shifts by the policies, but bond buyers are
eventually worse off by an unexpected tax burden. The analysis is
based on the role of default in determining an equilibrium. The cri-
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tique here focuses on the role of default in a trade outside the market
which is Pareto improving at an inefficient equilibrium. Kaneko
shows that a general equilibrium with default in an abstract contract
market can be constrained Pareto optimal. Hence this paper also lies
in a series of attempts by the author to analyze the relationship be-
tween economic equilibrium and default.
This paper is organized as follows. The section introduces the no-
tion of the gains to trade and clarifies that the rate of a general con-
sumption tax is equal to the gains to trade at the inefficient equilib-
rium allocation after tax. The section explains the way how the gov-
ernment can use the general consumption tax to seize in deliveries of
commodities in a Pareto improving trade by consumers outside the
market. The section gives a simple example to expose the critique
numerically. The section 	 discusses new-classical public economics
models briefly. The summary of the critique and related remarks are
given in the section.
 General Consumption Tax as the Gains to Trade
The critique is based on the notion of gains to trade at an attainable
allocation in the general equilibrium theory. In Dubey and Geanak-
oplos
, this notion is defined and its important property is
proved. At any attainable allocation, the larger the gains to trade is,
the more inefficient the allocation is. The importance of this notion in
the critique lies in that the gains to trade corresponds to the maxi-
mum in cyclic products of marginal rates of substitution, hence to the
rate of the general consumption tax if it is introduced.

Consider a private ownership economy EXi, ui, ei, qiiI,YjjJ,
A Critique on General Consumption Tax
 

which consists of I consumers and J producers, trading L commodi-
ties. We adopt all standard assumptions for this economy that makes
the second welfare theorem valid. We also assume that all utilities are
strictly concave, twice differentiable, and satisfy the boundary condi-
tion, in order to define continuous marginal rates of substitution and
avoid the multiplicity of demand and corner solutions. It is also as-
sumed that all production possibility sets are strictly convex, in order
to avoid the multiplicity of supply.
I introduce the formal definition of the gains to trade just as in
Dubey and Geanakoplos, with a cosmetic extension to a pro-
duction economy. Letx , yxiiI,yjjJbe an attainable alloca-

tion for E . An attainable trade by consumers atx , yis ttiiI 
PiIRL such that xi	tiXi for all iI , and SiI ti
. For any g, the
g-diminished trade from an attainable trade by consumers t atx , yis
tgtigiI, where, for each iI and, . . . , L,
ti, g
minti,, ti,	g. 
This means that ti, g
ti, if ti,, and ti, g
 ti,	g if ti,. Hence,
in the g-diminished trade, the delivery of each commodity in the trade
is lost by the fraction g	g .Note that, by the positive monotonicity of
consumption sets,x	tg, yis also attainable.The gains to trade at
x, y, denoted as gx, y, is defined by
gx, ysup



g
there exists an attainable trade by
consumers atx, y, t, such thatx	tg, y
Pareto improvesx, y

	


. 
  
 
If the set in the right hand side is empty, then gx, y. When utili-
ties are continuously differentiable, gx, ygives the least upper bound
on rates of default allowed in Pareto improving infinitesimal trades by
consumers atx, y. The gains to trade atx, ymeasures the ineffi-
ciency of the allocation in the distribution of consumption. The
higher the gains to trade is, the higher in rate a default is allowed to
improvex, y. The gains to trade being high means that the alloca-
tionx, ylargely fails to exploit gains from trade available in the mar-
ket.
Let n	, . . . , L
. We calliknk,knk I nLn a trading cycle
of length n. Its interpretation is that, for each k, . . . , n, the con-
sumer ik sells the commodityk and buys the commodityk, where
n is identified with. The set of all trading cycles of length n is de-
noted as Cn. In Dubey and Geanakoplos, the following result is
proved under a set of moderate assumptions, when xi is in the interior
of Xi for all i I.
gx, ymax	P nkMRS ikk,kxiknnL,iknk,knkCn
.

Here, MRS ikk,kxikis the marginal rate of substitution on the com-
In reality, a g-diminished Pareto improving trade may include transactions
by firms. It seems possible to extend the notion of the gains to trade to con-
tain transactions by firms, by assuming that a default occurs only in transac-
tions related to final consumptions. In this paper, no attempt is made in this
direction, however.
The attainable allocation may also have an inefficiency from the mis-choice
by the production sector. However, in the purpose of evaluating the general
consumption tax, this inefficiency is out of concern. Though the general con-
sumption tax may alter the equilibrium relative prices that each firm faces,
firms are not asked to pay the tax, so that the system of marginal rates of
transformation for each firm is equal to to the system of relative prices.
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modityk, measured by the commodityk, for the consumer ik at the
consumption xik . It coincides with the ratio of marginal utilities,
MRS ikk,kxik
uik
xkxik
uik
xkxik
.
Now we consider what an introduction of a general consumption
tax brings on the equilibrium allocation in the market. Letp, x, ybe
a competitive equilibrium with transfer payments without tax. Sup-
pose that a general consumption tax is introduced into the market by
the rate a. Let a new equilibrium price system be p. In the new equi-
  librium, all firms face to p and choose new production plans y. Let xi
be the consumption vector of the consumer i in the new equilibrium.
   Let tixi	eiS j
J qi, jyj. If ti,, the consumer i is buying and
must pay the priceap. If ti,, he faces the price p. Therefore,
xi is characterized by the following condition,
 a
p
p if ti, and ti,,
  MRS i,xi



a
p
p if ti, and ti,, 
p
p otherwise.
 Pick any x that is attainable with respect to y and satisfies the condi-
 tionfor all consumers. Then the allocationx, yis realized in the
new equilibrium with transfer payments under the price system p
and the general consumption tax with its rate a. Each consumer i re-
 ceives a transfer payment Sti,apti, Sti, pti,. This amo-
unts to be the sum of the lump-sum redistribution of income, pti,
and the return of the consumption tax payment, aSti, pti,. Hence
such transfer payments by the government is feasible. Since all tax
  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payments are returned as exactly paid, the role of the general con-
sumption tax is nothing but creating a discrepancy in marginal rate of
substitutions among consumers.
 By the property, it is clear that gx, ya. Hence, for any posi-
tive g slightly smaller than a, there exists an attainable trade by con-
   sumers atx, ywhose g-diminished trade Pareto improvesx, y. Not
only that the equilibrium allocation is made Pareto suboptimal, which
is quite obvious without any elaborated theory, but also the tax rate
itself is a valid measure of this inefficiency, in the sense that it gives
the least upper bound of default rates that allow Pareto improving
trades. We can extract a Pareto improving cyclic trade from a Pareto
improving trade, so that we may assume these Pareto improving
trades correspond to trading cycles.
Now, who will propose such a Pareto improving trade and who will
stealthe deliveries of commodities The government will.
 Plunder of Deliveries by the Government
The problem lies in the ability of the government to make a com-
plex trade outside the market. In general, Pareto improving trades
with a large rate of default involve exchange of many commodities
It may seem odd that all payments for the general consumption tax is re-
turned as they are paid. This is so because the model is static and without
uncertainty. The Japanese government says the revenue from the general
consumption tax will be exclusively used forwelfare, which consists
mainly of pension, health-care, and social security. This amounts to say that
the revenue will be returned to consumers in their life-time. Consumers ex-
pect to be paid back later at least the amount they paid, on average. With-
out time and uncertainty, this nature is simplified to the atemporal return of
tax payments exactly as paid.
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among many consumers. That is so even when they are restricted to
cyclical trades. There are plenty of potentially Pareto improving
trades that a small group of consumers can execute outside the mar-
ket, such as an exchange of courtesy gifts, a strategic barter, and a
trade backed by a societal mutual aide. Such trades cannot allow a de-
fault since its very existence destroys the credibility of the trades and
nullifies them. A possibility of default arises in a complex trade in
which each transaction is relatively very small and its relation to the
other transactions is not easily perceived by economic agents involved
in that transaction. In such a trade, a default in each transaction is
perceived to be tiny and unrelated to other transactions. There is no
economic agent other than the government who has an ability to
make such complex transactions outside the market.
Suppose that the government has an ability to execute various at-
tainable trades by consumers that Pareto improve a given attainable
allocation. By incorporating a general consumption tax with the rate a,
the government can achieve two things. First, it can choose a new
equilibrium allocation for consumers, x, such that it is attainable by the
total resource SiI eiSjJ yj, and satisfies the conditionfor all iI .
Any such allocation can be realized by income transfers and returns
of tax revenue. Then, it can propose and execute, in a g-diminished
 fashion, a trade by consumers t that Pareto improvesx, y, for a posi-
tive g up to a. This trade is executed outside the market under a
strict control by the government. Consumers have no reason to op-
pose such a proposal, since it is Pareto improving. On the course of
transactions, the government seizes gg of all commodity deliveries.
	
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The government may not have a total control in these two steps. In
the first step, a group of consumers may have a large influence on the
decision by the government, so successfully refuses to accept any de-
crease in its economic welfare. In this case, the choice of x must be
made under the condition that it does not lower the economic welfare
of the group from that in x. Also, the government is likely to face a
great difficulty in setting the new equilibrium price system as it de-
sires. If the equilibrium price system without tax remains a candidate
for the new equilibrium, many traders may expect that it prevails at
least in a short-run. Though the government may manipulate a part of
the market information, leading to the aimed price system correctly
will be very difficult since the price setting involves behavioral choices
of all economic agents. In the second step, the ability of the govern-
ment may heavily restrict the variation of Pareto improving trades t.
Trades may be restricted to cyclical ones, the number of transactions
may be limited, consumers involved in a trade may be limited, the size
of each transaction may be limited, and so forth. If a proposed trade
has large-sized transactions, even a very small g guarantees a large
gain for the government. If not, the government will need to set g
very close to a in order to secure a large gain. A social environment
surrounding the government, such as a political intervention by the
congress, may prevent to set g too close to a.
Also, the level of a may restrict the choice set of Pareto improving
trades non-monotonically. Depending on the way how the new equilib-
  riump, x, ydepends on a, a Pareto improving trade available at a
lower a may no longer be available at a higher a.
Taking all these restrictions into account, the government still has a
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large degree of freedom for its choice to seek a gain, since the govern-
ment can set both x and tggiven a, and quite possibly has a great
influence on the decision to set the level of a. The way how such a
gain is made possible seems quite vicious. A general consumption tax
is solely used to create a discrepancy in marginal rates of substitution
and secure the least upper bound on the rate of seizure available to
the government. Consumers are put into the situation in which they
have no incentive to refuse a proposal of Pareto improving trade by
the government, even accepting that gg of all commodity deliveries
are seized by the government. Though the choice set of Pareto im-
proving trades may not depend on a monotonically, it is generally the
case that a higher consumption tax rate is advantageous for the gov-
ernment to make a gain through a seizure of deliveries. In other
words, a general consumption tax is nothing but a device to put con-
sumers into a misery systematically, make them accept a help by the
government, and pay for such a help as the government asks. I used
the wordplunderin the title of this section because of this observa-
tion.
It may be claimed that, putting the sub-optimality of the allocation
aside, a general consumption tax is not to be blamed, but the behavior
of the government itself is. The important point that the critique em-
phasizes is that a general consumption tax gives explicitly the maxi-
mal rate of seizure the government can force on an infinitesimal Pa-
reto improving trade, so that it makes the opportunity of plunder a
common knowledge among members of the government. Even when all
members know such an opportunity, it is not taken if it is not a com-
	
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mon knowledge among them, since executing a governmental trade
requires coordinating members of the government to work together
for a purpose commonly understood. With a general consumption tax,
it is common knowledge among members of the government that
there exists a small g-diminished trade that Pareto improves consum-
ers, where g is below but arbitrarily close to the tax rate. A distribu-
tion scheme in the government can be easily exploited to make it
common knowledge among all relevant members that they have a
chance to gain by the seizure of commodity deliveries. Hence they
have a common purpose to search a Pareto improving trade with a
seizure of deliveries by the government, starting from an infinitesi-
mally small one, which is easy to find, and experimenting for more
profitableones. A shrewd bureaucratic system performs this search
very efficiently. In short, a general consumption tax corrupts the gov-
ernment.
Finding an infinitesimally small trade from which the government
can seize by the rate very close to a is important, since it is most
likely that a trade that extends it in scale yields a large gain to the
government. In such an infinitesimally small trade, the government
can seize all commodities involved in the trade by the rate almost
equal to a. This means that all consumers are put in the condition
that they are only marginally improved. By making its trading volume
larger and keeping a drop in the rate of seizure minimal so as to force
the same condition to consumers, the government will be able to plun-
der as much as possible. The proof ofin Dubey and Geanakoplos
	tells that there is a simple procedure to find a candidate of the
trade based solely on the knowledge of the equilibrium after tax,
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namely, observables in the market. First, find a trading cycle compat-
ible with t, in which commodities with positive prices are involved as
many as possible. Let it beiknk,knk. Next, for each ik, k, . . . , n,
determine the direction tik and the weight dik of the trade as follows.
The vector tik is defined by,
pk ifk,
tik,	



pk ifk,

 otherwise,
wheren	. The weightsdikk, . . . , n is defined recursively. Put
di	. For k, assume that dik is already defined, and put
dik	
dikpk
pk . Finally, for each k, . . . , n, define a trade vector for
ik by tik	ldiktik.,where l
 is chosen so that the trade tik is feasible for
alliknk. Note that ptik
, namely, the trade tik is budget feasible
for the consumer ik, for all k, . . . , n. The construction ofdikk, . . . , n
implies that the trade of commodityk in t is cleared for all k, . . . , n.
Hence the Walras law proves that the trade of commodity is also
cleared. So, we have Snk tik
, and the trade t is attainable by con-
sumers. It is also clear that the execution of the trade t by the gov-
ernment does not cost at all under the equilibrium price vector p. To
verifyroughlythat tik is infinitesimally improving for the consumer
ik, let pik be defined by

 
pik,	



ap if tik,
,
p otherwise.
  Since Duikxikis positively collinear with pik, Duikxiktik has the same
   sign as piktik. Since ptik
, the latter is equal to ldikapk pk
.
 Since piktikaptik
 for all k, . . . , n, the rate of seizure g in
the infinitesimal t can be set arbitrary close to a with all consumers
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involved in it improved only marginally.
The theory I have proposed so far does not tell who are main bene-
ficiaries in the government. For that purpose, a structure of the gov-
ernment, including not only its membership but also all interest
groups related to it, must be assumed additionally. I leave this as-
sumption free. The reason is that there should be no taboo in setting
it. For example, it should be allowed to set assumptions that make
managers of mass-production firms that have obsolete technologies,
foreign interests with a close political andor economic relation to
some part of the government etc. as main beneficiaries.
Many will denounce the critique by the reason that there seems to
be no corresponding procedure for the plunder currently available to
the government in reality. On the contrary, there are plenty. Note
that the argument is based on a static model, which abstracts a long-
run average in a long-run economy. The government draws up the
national budget backed by tax revenues and national debts. Each item
in the budget corresponds to a group of economic agents and their
trade vectorsas long-run averages. The budget is balanced in the
long-run, and no economic agent is expected to lose his money. Hence
all monetary transactions required for these trades, including tax,
must be zero in the long-run. Since the government has a vast free-
dom in drawing up the national budget, even with the restriction that
it is balanced in the long-run, it can execute various trades. The trade
t constructed in the previous paragraph satisfies the restriction, and is
easy to execute for the government since it is entirely made of ob-
servables in the market.
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Table. Types of Consumers
Types
Consumer
Consumption Set
R
Utility Function
x



x



Initial
Endowment
,
Share


Consumer R x



x



, 
 An Expository Example
In this section, I analyze a simple example of comparative statics to
obtain a numerical justification for the critique. Two commodities are
traded. There are two types of consumers which are populated
equally. There is a firm, representing a total production, which has a
technology that takes the commodity  as input and produces the
commodity.
Example Table gives the complete characterization for two
types of consumers. In this table, the figures for initial endowments
and shares are for the total population of corresponding types.
A firm has the technology represented by the following production
function,
y	


y,
where
yis the input of the commodity and y is the output of
the commodity.
The government consists of% of the type consumers.
First, we calculate the competitive equilibrium. A simple computa-
tion gives that, in the competitive equilibrium, the relative price of the
commodities, the ratio of the price of the commodity to that of the
  
 
commodity, is q



. This determines the consumption vectors of
consumers and the input-output vector of the firm. The firm chooses
	,


	 
. The type  consumers choose,


 
collectively. The
type consumers choose, 


 
collectively. This gives the utility
u 

	
 to the type  consumers collectively. A spreadsheet cal-
culation returns that u .
Now, suppose that the general consumption tax of the rate % is
implemented. Assume that the type consumers are not worse off by
its implementation, since the government consists entirely of this type.
Let the new equilibrium relative price be denoted by q. The firm
choosesqq
. This determines the initial trade point of each
consumer type as the sum of the endowment vector and the physical
share of the input-output vector chosen by the firm, which isq

q
.
The type consumers buy the commodity and sell the com-
modity, while the type  consumers sell the commodity  and buy
the commodity . By the trade, both consumers must be improved

Suppose that each type of consumers is populated by  million. Currently
there are about  million of national public workers in Japan, and I as-
sume that makes up roughly% of all household, at most. The reason why
they are of type is that consumers of this type are not worse off by the in-
troduction of the general consumption tax if the relative price of the com-
modities remains the same after its introduction, as the calculation will show.
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from the initial trade point. The type consumers choose collectively
the consumption vector x that satisfies MRSxx


x	q, while
the type  consumers choose collectively the consumption vector x
that satisfies MRSx x


x
q
	. By solving these with the market
clearing condition, we get
x 	
q,
and
x q	
q.
Then, xq is equivalent to qq where q 	

, while
xq is equivalent to q q where q 

. A spreadsheet cal-
culation returns that q			 and q	. Now we
proceed to a spreadsheet calculation of utilities on candidate values of
q. The grid is taken by the scale, from	 to	. This calcu-
lation reveals that the type consumers are improved from the initial
trade point if and only if q	, while the type consumers are im-
proved from the initial trading point if and only if q. Further-
	Since consumers pay the tax only for their buys, the initial trading point
matters greatly for them. The assumption that a owner of a firm claims the
physical share is adopted in this critique, following a tradition of the general
equilibrium theory. Note that the analysis is comparative statics, so that the
original equilibrium consumption vector cannot be the initial trading point,
since it is made to be counter-factual. It can be in the dynamic setting, with
an additional allocation of difference in the equilibrium production by some
rule.
 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more, the utility for type consumers is improved from u if and only
if q, where q	. Hence any q
, qgives an equi-
librium with transfer payments in which the type  consumers are
not worse off from the competitive equilibrium consumption. One ob-
serves that, compared with the competitive equilibrium without tax,
the introduction of the general consumption tax may lower the rela-
tive price and hence vitalize the production activity.
Assume that the relative price remains the same as that in the com-
petitive equilibrium without tax. We denote the post-tax equilibrium
  consumption by xx, x. Similarly, we denote the type is collective
utility at the after-tax equilibrium by ui, for each i
,. By drawing
an Edgeworth box diagram, it is easily revealed by inspection that an
infinitesimally small trade by consumers in the direction t, q.
, qmakes both consumers strictly better off, and that the gov-
ernment can seize maximally from this trade. Let the size of this
trade be denoted by l. For each l, the maximal seizure rate by the
government is given by the least upper bound of positive gs such that
the g-diminished trade of lt Pareto improves the equilibrium alloca-
tion. Let it be denoted by gl. It is calculated as the minimum of
gland gl, where, for each i 
, , gilis given by the value
of g for which the type i consumers are indifferent between the con-
sumption with the g-diminished trade and that without it. The maxi-
mal seizure from the trade of the size l by the government is
gll
glt. It is consumed by members of the government in addition
to the consumption with the gl-diminished trade. The argument is
visualized in Figure.
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The value of l for which the effective rate of seizure by the govern-
ment, gllgl, is maximized can be calculated with a help of a spread-
sheet. Candidate values of l are numbers in, 	
, varied
by the scale. The values of gland g	lare calculated by the
formulas,
gl l
 ux,	lq

	x,
,
and,
g	l lq

 u	x	,l

	x	,	
.
Figure: The equilibrium after tax and a Pareto improving trade with a sei-
zure by the government.
  			
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 The values of xi and ui, for each i, , are calculated from q
	
, according to the equations in the previous paragraph and the
market clearing condition. A calculation shows that g	
			
	
	 and g	
				
	. This confirms that the
government can seize almost% from an infinitesimally small trade in
the direction of t. This calculation also shows that gllglis maxi-
mized at l	
	 with the value	
			. Hence the seizure
by the government is in the order	, while the collective consump-
tion by the members of the government, 	xtgl
, is
	
			, 	
		, almost in the order 	. Namely, the
seizure by the government is at most in 	 order of the consump-
tion available to the members of the government. The members of the
government do not gain very much by the plunder. The utility from
the consumption with the addition of the gl-diminished consump-
tion for % of the type  consumers is 	
			. With the addi-
tional consumption of the seizure, the utility becomes 	
				.
The rate of utility gain is only in the order	.
Next, suppose that the general consumption tax of the rate	% is
implemented, instead of %. A spreadsheet calculation returns that
any relative price q in the range	
	, 	
makes up an equilib-
rium with transfer payments. In order to sustain the economic welfare
of type consumers at the level in the competitive equilibrium with-
out tax, q	
must be satisfied. Hence, again, we assume that the
relative price after tax remains the same as that in the competitive
equilibrium without it. Another spreadsheet calculation shows that the
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value of l becomes , which gives the maximized value of
gll
	
glas		.
Compared with the case of% tax rate, its
order is up by 	. The consumption by the members of the govern-
ment with the addition of the gl-diminished trade of lt is
	, 	, which gives the collective utility
		. This utility figure is almost the same as that in the case
of% tax rate, though slightly lower.It is still marginally better than
that in the original competitive equilibrium.The seizure by the gov-
ernment is		,. By consuming this seizure
additionally, the members of the government obtain the collective util-
ity		. The utility increase appears in the order	, so the
rate of utility gain is in the order		. Both are an order higher than
those in the case of% tax rate. This is made possible by two factors.
First, the equilibrium allocation is made less welfare-efficient, so that
the size of the Pareto improving trade which maximizes the seizure
by the government is made larger. Secondly, by the same reason, the
maximal rate of seizure by the government is made larger. The gov-
ernment takes a larger role in the trade outside the market with the
increase of the tax rate. It is motivated to do so since the plunder
available to it improves the economic welfare of its members effi-
ciently. Compared with the competitive equilibrium without tax, the
type  consumers who are not the members of the government are
When the tax rate is	%, maximizing gll	
gldoes not imply that the col-
lective utility of the members of the government is maximized. The latter is
actually maximized at l. However, the loss in the utility is in the or-
der	, which is negligibly small.
  	
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not worse off, but the increase in their collective utility is negligibly
small, appearing only in the order when normalized to% of the
total population of the type. However, for the members of the gov-
ernment, it appears in the order of. Since the original equilibrium
allocation is Pareto optimal, the type  consumers are worse off. In
other words, the members of the government gain big, consumers of
the same type as them do not lose or gain, and consumers of the dif-
ferent type lose significantly. Quite obviously, how much the members
of the government gain by the plunder depends on its population. If it
is large, say more than% of the total population, the seizure by the
government is widely spread out among its members, and the gain for
each member becomes unattractively small. If it is small, say less than
	% of the total population, the gain for each member becomes so
large that it is in the same order as the utility without the consump-
tion of the seizure. 

In the example, the members of the government are assumed to be
those who are not worse off by implementing the general consump-
tion tax. Such a nature seems to be common in the real world. Those
who are for implementing a general consumption tax are those who
are assured not to be worse off by it. With a chance to plunder, some
of them may be even eager to implement it. In reality, such a group
may include those who are not economic agents in the domestic econ-
omy, such as foreign interest groups, for example.
It seems to be common also in the real world that the trade outside
the market, that is executed by the government, is immensely influ-
enced by political bargaining since it is determined in the national
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budget. In the example, the type consumers may be regarded to be
weak in the political bargaining when the implementation of a general
consumption tax is planned, since none of them are a member of the
government. The information available to them may be strictly con-
trolled by the government in order to hide the prospect that the
members of the government is significantly better off by making
them worse off.
 Consumption by the Government as Externalities
So far, it is assumed that the government does not have a role other
than intervening in the market system. Many will claim that such a
view misrepresents the nature of the government, since the govern-
ment offers various services which all economic agents appreciate
both inside and outside the market system, more or less. In this sec-
tion, representative economic theories that incorporate government
services positively are discussed briefly. It is emphasized that there is
no role of a general consumption tax in any of these theories.
In connection to a general consumption tax, the economic theory
which suits the best seems to be the one taking the consumption by
the government as externalities to economic agents. In this theory,
utilities of consumers and technologies of firms depend on the con-
sumption by the government. To justify that economic agents bear
the cost of the consumption by the government, the externalities are
assumed to be positive mostly. The first-best Pareto optimal solution
is given by a Lindahl equilibrium. The idea is to allow each consumer
and each firm to choose the level of the consumption by the govern-
ment under the constraint that each of their choices satisfies the re-
 	
 
 
source constraint, in the social optimization problem. By decentralizing
the social optimization problem via the Kuhn-Tucker theoremif it is
applicable, a Pareto optimal allocation is realized in a Lindahl equilib-
rium, where different economic agent faces different price vector for
the consumption by the government. The sum of these price vector is
equal to the market price vector, so that an efficient cost sharing is
achieved. All marginal utility vectors and marginal transformation
vectors for private goods must be collinear with the market price vec-
tor in a Lindahl equilibrium. Hence it is obvious that the introduction
of a general consumption tax destroys the first best property of a Lin-
dahl equilibrium. except in a singular case that there is no externality
in the production and all consumers and the government consume ex-
actly the same.
The idea of Lindahl has a flaw that the government consumption is
personalizedto each economic agent, so that each economic agent
becomes a monopolistic buyer and, as such, has no incentive to be
price-taking for the consumption by the government. Therefore an im-
plementation of the efficient cost sharing as a truth-telling solution of
a game is theorized. The classic example of such an implementation
theory is the Groves mechanism. In this mechanism, for the consump-
tion of each goods by the government, each economic agent an-
nounces how much he wants to pay, but the amount an economic
agent actually pays is determined entirely by other economic agents
as the difference between the first-best cost required and the sum of
all payments by other economic agents. More general implementation
as a Nash equilibrium of a game, a dominant strategy equilibrium of a
game etc. has been developed. In these theories, a game is formed in
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which each economic agent uses an announcement of his preference
as a strategy and truth-telling by all agents constitutes an equilibrium.
The efficient cost sharing is indirectly implemented by calculating a
Lindhal equilibrium based on the announced preferences. In the imple-
mentation theory, the mechanism to achieve the efficient cost sharing
is separated from the market system in which the cost sharing to be
implemented is determined. Such a mechanism no longer relies on the
market system, so that a general consumption tax has no role in the
mechanism. It can work only in a hypothetical market process where
a cost sharing to be implemented is determined. Not only a general
consumption tax makes its solution suboptimal, but also it is made to
exist only imaginary. Hence implementing a general consumption tax
becomes nothing but an absurdity.
 Concluding Remarks
This paper emphasizes the fact that the rate of a general consump-
tion tax is equal to the gains to trade at the equilibrium allocation af-
ter tax, and draws our attention on its implication that the opportu-
nity of gain by a plunder becomes a common knowledge among the
relevant members of the government. Since the tax rate always corre-
sponds to the maximal rate of seizure in an infinitesimal Pareto im-
proving trade, the government becomes eager to raise it by a hope of
large gain from a seizure. As the example. shows, such a large gain
can be achieved by just extending an infinitesimal Pareto improving
trade and keeping the drop of the seizure rate minimum. A good can-
didate of this infinitesimal trade can be obtained by the knowledge of
the equilibrium after tax, namely, by that of observables in the mar-
 	
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ket. In it, each individual trade is budget feasible, so that the govern-
ment can execute it under a balanced budget.
The critique is not intended to discredit the entire government. We
all know that many public workers are motivated to serve unselfishly
to the public. Most of them are not in the position to make an influ-
ence on a national system, and as such do not receive any additional
allocation of a seizure by the government. Only a small group of the
members of the government, such as the top-level bureaucrats and
the cabinet members, can decide the implementation of a general con-
sumption tax. With a common knowledge of the opportunity of plun-
der, such influential members and their close associates become cor-
rupt quite easily.
Instead, the critique is mostly intended to draw our attention on the
importance of the gains from trade in the market system, or in any
trade system in fact. The purpose of trading is exactly to realize po-
tential gains from trade as much as possible, so that maximizing the
realized gains from trade is principally important in any economic sys-
tem involving trades. How much gains to trade is left is a good meas-
ure of inefficiency in the realization of gains from trade, in any com-
plex market trades. A general consumption tax increases this ineffi-
ciency directly, so we may regard it as the most hazardous interven-
tion in the market system. To make things worse, it visualizes the in-
efficiency to the government, which is originally unobservable as a
In the theory of public economics, it is customary to assume that economic
agents arecorruptin the sense that they try to free-ride to each other.
However, the government consists of these same economic agents, so that
we should assume that its members also act selfishly when they have a
prospect to receive a big personal gain.
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geometric mean of the rates of marginal substitution. Since the gov-
ernment has an ability to execute various trades outside the market, a
common knowledge of the opportunity of plunder associated with the
inefficiency gives it a strong incentive to bring the conceptual hazard
into a reality. In the section, it is stated that the government works
fine in realizing a Pareto optimal allocation if it creates a non-market
social system as the implementation theory suggests. Building such a
system will require an enormous task of working from a scratch,
while implementing a general consumption tax is much easier once it
is accepted in the market economy. It is the governments inability to
build a self-contained social system that motivates the implementation
of a general consumption tax. The government without talent be-
comes parasitic on the market system and seeks a plunder.
Related to the importance of gains from trade, there is another im-
portant aspect to be addressed, though it is currently in a form of
sheer conjecture. Roughly speaking, it is a conjecture that the effi-
ciency to realize gains from trade in an economic system is a driving
force of a creative innovation in that system. Here a creative innova-
tion means that it brings a completely new commodity into the econ-
omy if it is successful, and the uncertainty on its success is beyond
anyones imagination. A few catch ideas for a creative innovation,
mostly by luck, as an exogenous shock. To turn these ideas into a
commodity which can be traded in the market, resources must be al-
located to that effort. Those consists of theinnovative mind, the sole
unreproducible and indispensable input in any production process, and
many other commodities that theinnovative mindcalls for. Since
nobody knows the structure of the uncertainty on its success, some
	 
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dummy must be substituted for the uncertainty of return in order to
evaluate aprofitabilityof such an effort. The conjecture claims that
this dummy is given by the uncertainty of the gains from trade, meas-
ured negatively by the gains to trade at the equilibrium allocation in
the current period, under an invariant distribution on the economic
environment. Based on this conjecture, a general consumption tax
lowers directly the dummy return on any creative innovation. Hence a
general consumption tax discourages a creative innovation, very effec-
tively.
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Behind this claim, it is assumed that the uncertainty on the economic envi-
ronment is stationary and ergodic, until a new commodity is introduced by a
creative innovation. Failures in innovative efforts are quite often, as they
fails mostly, so that the uncertainty on its failure is already a part of ergodic
stationary process of the economic environment. Hence the uncertainty asso-
ciated with a creative innovation is made stationary and ergodic by the use
of the dummy. This enables to incorporate a decision on a creative innova-
tion into a stationary equilibrium.
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Summary
A Critique on General Consumption Tax
Fumihiro KANEKO
I criticize that a general consumption tax brings not only an ineffi-
ciency of the market equilibrium allocation but also a corruption of the
government. The rate of a general consumption tax is equal to the
gains to trade at the inefficient equilibrium allocation, which corre-
sponds to the maximal rate of default allowed in an infinitesimal Pa-
reto improving trade by consumers. It is by itself unobservable in the
market, but the implementation of a general consumption tax makes it
observable. Since the government is the sole economic agent that has
an ability to execute complex trades outside the market which allow
default, a general consumption tax makes an opportunity of seizure a
common knowledge among relevant members of the government. By
finding an infinitesimal Pareto improving trade in which the govern-
ment can seize almost maximally, and extending it with keeping the
drop in the rate of seizure minimum so as to force consumers only
marginally improved, they can gain in utility significantly by the sei-
zure. Such a trade can be constructed out of observables in the mar-
ket and can be executed under the balanced budget by the govern-
ment.
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